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Abstract 
Around the world, government policies to support new renewable energy technologies rely on accurate 
estimates of Levelised Cost of Energy (LCOE). This paper reveals that such estimates are based on 
“public domain” data which may be unreliable. A new approach and methodology has been developed 
which uses United Kingdom (UK) “audited” data, published in company accounts that has been 
obtained from Companies House, to determine more accurate LCOE estimates. The methodology is 
applicable to projects configured within Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) companies. The methodology 
is then applied to a number of UK offshore wind farms and one Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) 
project, with cost data then compared to that presently in the public domain. The analysis reveals that 
recent offshore wind projects show a slightly declining LCOE and that public domain cost estimates 
are unreliable. But of most concern is that offshore wind farm costs are still much higher than those 
implied by recent bids for UK government financial support via Contracts for Difference (CfDs). The 
paper concludes by addressing further the question of how offshore wind projects can achieve the 
degree of LCOE reductions required by recent CfD bids. 
 
1. Introduction 
Offshore wind is expected to become an important component in the global future energy mix[1], 
including in the United Kingdom [2], Germany, Denmark, Japan, India and the United States of 
America[1,3]. The focus of this paper is on the United Kingdom (UK). 
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At present, offshore wind projects around the world are not directly cost-competitive with other forms 
of electricity generation [4]. In the UK, offshore wind projects are supported by government-mandated 
Contracts for Difference (CfDs). To secure financial support, developers are now bidding very 
aggressively, to the extent that the strike prices have fallen dramatically from around £150/MWh to 
£57.50/MWh between the first awards and the most recent auction rounds [5]. The capital and 
operating cost reductions implied by these bids are large, and are not supported by the overall trend of 
offshore wind farm costs for those projects already in operation. 
 
Accurate evaluations of Levelised Cost of Energy (LCOE) are critical to policy choices and investment 
appraisal for offshore wind farms: the aim of this paper is to establish a new methodology to provide 
better information for policy and decision-making. This approach is based on calculating the LCOE 
applicable to energy projects undertaken through Special Purpose Vehicle companies (SPVs). The 
methodology is applied to a range of UK offshore wind farms in particular.  
 
There is a considerable literature on costs and learning rates for offshore wind [4,6-14]. The literature 
on wind farm costs ranges from simple assessments of the comparative cost of electricity generation 
alternatives [4,6,7], through development of cost breakdown structures [8] and probabilistic 
assessments [9,10] to detailed evaluation of learning rates [11-13] and meta-analyses of learning rates 
[14]. 
 
The literature relies heavily on estimates of capital and operating costs from public domain sources. 
Ederer [15] has observed that cost data for offshore wind farms gathered from press reports or 
commercial databases can be unreliable, as “it is difficult to detect whether the figures were 
massaged”. In the case of online databases and reports from consulting companies, “where the original 
source is often not disclosed”…“it is not clear how the data were processed” [15]. In our own review of 
the literature we found that extant sources generally used for cost information are precisely those 
whose accuracy Ederer’s observations have thrown into doubt [15]. It is against this backdrop that this 
paper provides a new and robust approach to sourcing cost data which we believe should be more 
relevant, reliable and consistent than that currently in the public domain. It considers whether and why 
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such data might be distorted, and compares data sourced using this approach to the publicly available 
data most commonly used in the literature. 
 
The paper is divided into 8 sections. Section 1 introduces the paper. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature in the area of cost estimation with particular reference to offshore wind, and summarises the 
main sources of cost data and the uses to which it is put. Section 3 discusses the validity, robustness 
and potential for distortion of various data sources, while Section 4 sets out the new methodology used 
for gathering and working with audited data to provide the accurate capital and operating costs required 
to develop informed levelised cost of energy (“LCOE”) calculations. 
 
Section 5 comprises the main conclusions for UK offshore wind farms, although the method is equally 
applicable in other countries with significant offshore wind development (such as Germany and 
Denmark) and to other technologies (an example is provided for a Combined Cycle Gas Turbine - 
CCGT - power project). It includes sensitivity calculations on discount rate – a key factor in LCOE 
calculation. Section 6 compares the new results with data derived from other public domain sources 
commonly used by other researchers and shows that these public domain sources can be significantly 
different to cost data derived from accounts. Section 7 explores the implications for cost reduction 
targets for new wind projects in the context of recent CfD bids. 
 
Section 8 discusses the new methodology and draws important conclusions. 
2. Literature review 
Cost comparisons of alternative electricity generation technologies are essential in informing policy 
choices. In a world transitioning from carbon-emitting thermal power generating technologies (such as 
gas and coal-fired power stations) to carbon-neutral and renewable choices (including offshore wind), a 
well-informed understanding of comparative costs must lie at the foundation of informed policy 
decisions. 
 
The literature is rich with examples of cost comparisons and evaluation of cost trends in specific 
technologies. It is immediately obvious that where underlying cost data is of poor quality, any 
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conclusions may be in doubt. This brief review considers some of this literature, setting out some of the 
uses to which cost data is put and examines the sources of cost data used in these examples. 
2.1. Cost comparisons 
The simplest application of cost data is to provide comparisons of the costs of energy alternatives. Such 
comparisons are widely used by Governments (e.g. the UK Government’s Department for Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) [6] and by commercial consultants such as Lazard, Ernst & 
Young and Arup [7,16,17]. 
 
BEIS expresses costs in terms of Levelised Cost of Energy (LCOE). LCOE is “the discounted lifetime 
cost of ownership and use of a generation asset, converted into an equivalent unit of cost of generation 
in £/MWh” [6].  





∑ 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(1+𝑑𝑑)𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶=1�  (1) 
 
Where t is the period ranging from year 1 to year n, Ct the capital cost in period t (including 
decommissioning), Ot the fixed operating cost in period t, Vt the variable operating cost in period t 
(including fuel cost, and sometimes taxes, carbon costs etc), Et the energy generated in period t, d, the 
discount rate, and n the final year of operation including decommissioning. A theoretical justification 
for LCOE was recently set out by Aldersey-Williams and Rubert [18]. 
BEIS calculates LCOE for renewable energy technologies (RETs) based on a report by Arup [17] 
which included updated “cost and technical assumptions for projects reaching FID (Final Investment 
Decision) between 2015 and 2030”. Arup’s report [17] outlines the data collection approach as 
involving a “broad mix of public, internal and stakeholder sources” and involving “manufacturers, 
projects developers and utility companies”. However, it is clear that such data can be susceptible to 
manipulation by participants, who might be expected to be concerned to shape policymakers’ opinions 
in favour of future projects. 
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Other commercial consultants, such as Lazard and Ernst & Young are even less specific about their 
data gathering approaches. Lazard’s analysis of LCOE is based on “Lazard estimates” [7], while Ernst 
& Young state that they rely on “validated sources and use average input data”. Ernst & Young add 
that their study is “based on publicly available information sources and average input data” [16]. 
Again, there is limited opportunity to confirm the validity of these data, which, if derived from public 
statements, may again be vulnerable to “massaging” or selective presentation by developers.  
In recent literature, Partridge [4] compared thermal and renewable costs and emphasised the 
importance of reliable cost inputs, including capital and operating costs, and costs of finance, in 
building up the overall LCOE comparison. His focus was “to examine the issues that can confound 
generation cost calculations rather than to produce definitive cost estimates”. In attempting to develop 
industry-wide LCOE calculations, he relied on public domain information and industry samples, rather 
than project specific and verifiable information and admitted that “even for “official” data, we should 
question the validity of cost estimates” [4]. 
2.2. Cost breakdown structures 
Gonzalez-Rodriguez [8] sought to improve the quality of LCOE estimates by developing cost estimates 
for each significant cost area of offshore wind development. He obtained aggregated cost data from the 
4C Offshore website [19] and component cost data from a range of technical, engineering and 
commercial sources, in order to develop expected costs for new offshore wind farm developments. In 
the light of Ederer’s [15] and Partridge’s [4] identification of the potential limitations of public 
databases, relying on the 4C Offshore dataset could leave Gonzalez-Rodriguez’s analysis of past costs 
open to challenge, due to possible errors in this data and/or manipulation by developers’ choices in data 
presentation. As will be shown in Section 6 – especially in the cases of the Dudgeon and West of 
Duddon Sands wind farms - the 4C Offshore data can be materially different to that from accounts 
data. 
2.3. Probabilistic evaluation 
Heck et al. [9] and Cartelle Barros et al. [10] both advocate probabilistic methods in LCOE estimation. 
These methods explicitly incorporate uncertainty in input data, and aim to provide insight into probable 
ranges of LCOE for different technologies, based on ranges of input data. 
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Cartelle Barros et al.’s data were “based on an extensive literature review of scientific articles, sector 
reports, real cases with published data and various interviews with an expert who has more than 40 
years in the energy sector in the international arena” [10] while Heck et al. “carefully collected cost and 
operational data from a variety of sources” and compared their probabilistic results “with other LCOE 
studies” [9]. 
2.4. Learning rates 
The learning rates achieved by onshore wind, and potentially to be expected by offshore wind, are of 
great interest to both developers and policymakers, as offshore wind is expected to be an important part 
of the decarbonised energy mix [2]. 
 
Evaluation of learning rates relies on high quality cost information and much work has been done in 
this area. Williams et al. [14] provides a meta-analysis of learning rates for wind power (including on- 
and offshore), drawn in large part from earlier work by Rubin et al. [20] and Lindman and Soderholm 
[21]. Unfortunately both of these earlier studies note that, as Lindman and Soderholm say “learning 
curve studies on offshore wind power are very few". 
 
Other workers have undertaken more sophisticated work in relation to learning curves for wind: van 
der Zwaan et al. [11] took account of the variability of some of the exogenous variables (such as costs 
of steel and copper), which affect the cost trajectory. Their underlying data was drawn from 4C 
Offshore and other public domain sources.  
 
MacGillivray et al. [13] assessed the learning rates required for marine renewables technologies (wave 
and tidal stream) to become competitive with “the benchmark technology” of offshore wind. Again, 
MacGillivray et al. employed offshore wind cost data from 4C Offshore [19]. 
2.5. Political and public argument 
Not all observers of offshore wind costs are supportive – the Global Warming Policy Foundation’s 
2017 paper “Offshore Strike Prices” [5] analysed offshore wind costs to explore whether the 
anticipated cost reductions are supported by past cost trends. The Foundation expressed a concern that 
 7 
developers face little penalty if they fail to deliver the projects awarded CfDs, and this could lead to a 
shortfall in national power generation if these costs cannot in practice be achieved. 
 
The Global Warming Policy Foundation used a number of data sources. It states that “the first is an 
EU-funded study by the FOWIND consortium (Facilitating Offshore Wind in India)” which covers 
various European sites. This report [3] recognises the difficulty of obtaining robust data, stating that 
“publically available information on the cost of offshore wind is challenging to obtain, with developers 
only ever quoting expected Capex figures (at financial close) in the public domain”. Expected costs 
necessarily exclude cost overruns, which can add materially to project costs. The report also notes that 
there is no consistent basis on which figures are put into the public domain, with different sources 
including different aspects of wind farm costs (the example given is port upgrade costs to support wind 
farm activities). 
 
The GWPF’s other sources were “a set of UK-specific figures obtained by one of the present authors, 
Capell Aris, through careful gleaning of press stories and press releases” and the 4C Offshore database 
[5]. 
 
It is clear that publicly available cost data is widely relied upon as the foundation for a range of 
analyses. This paper focuses on a method for developing more reliable cost data than that currently in 
the public domain, allowing these analyses to be developed with better accuracy in future. It appears 
that existing public domain data is potentially inaccurate, inconsistent and possibly susceptible to 
“massaging” in support of a political or commercial agenda. These findings should be of significant 
concern to policy-makers and taxpayers. 
3. Data sources – robustness and risks of distortion 
This paper uses audited accounting data from wind farm SPV companies, which are considered to be a 
more reliable source of actual expenditure information than information put into the public domain by 
wind farm developers. This view is worthy of investigation. 
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3.1. Why might developers distort data? 
Developers might wish to distort cost data available in the public domain for a number of reasons. 
These might include the desire to minimise tax, to present costs which would be considered acceptable 
to external commentators (to positively influence the wider debate on the acceptability and role of 
offshore wind), to influence policy (specifically in relation to policy support measures) or to mislead 
potential competitors in a competitive environment. 
 
3.2. Public domain vs. audited accounts data 
Public domain data, which is not subject to audit or investigation by the tax authorities, is clearly easier 
to distort than audited accounting information. In addition, third parties gathering and publishing cost 
information may have a particular agenda in relation to climate change (in either direction). 
 
We believe that there are a number of factors which lead us to expect that cost data from audited 
accounts would less liable to distortion than other data. 
3.2.1. Accounting standards and audit requirement 
Accounting standards exist to help ensure that like for like comparisons are meaningful, and the 
accounts provide a “true and fair view” of the financial status of a business. While there is always 
scope for some flexibility within the standards, they do provide some boundaries. 
 
Additionally, the requirement for audit confirms that the accounts for each SPV present a “true and fair 
view” and adhere to the accounting standards, providing some comfort that they should be substantially 
undistorted. It must be accepted that the audit process is not infallible.  
 
3.2.2. Tax investigation 
Another factor which is likely to encourage developers to keep their audited SPV accounts within 
reasonable bounds is the risk of a tax investigation. A public investigation of financial misreporting or 
distortion for reasons of tax optimisation would be likely to be both embarrassing and detrimental to 




SPVs are used to manage the risk of large and costly project developments, and frequently have 
multiple shareholders. This offers perhaps the best reason to consider SPV accounts as acceptably 
reliable - because the commercial interests and tolerance of the risk of making the distortion would 
have to align across all of the shareholders if the costs within the SPVs were to be distorted,.  
 
An analysis of how different participants in London Array account for capital costs (shown in Figure 1) 
shows that while there are timing differences in recognition of capital spend between participants in the 
London Array project, the total spend is closely matched between participants. This close match 
provides some reassurance that the audited accounts for wind farm SPVs accurately reflect the actual 
underlying costs. 
 
Figure 1 Timing differences in capital spend recognition - London Array (authors' analysis) 
 
3.3. High or low? 
The potential advantages to a developer of presenting the costs of offshore wind development as 
“higher than actual” or “lower than actual” are set out in Table 1. 
Stakeholder Higher than actual Lower than actual 
Tax position Reduces local tax liability, shifts tax Increases local tax liability, reduces tax 
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liability to other (potentially lower rate) 
regime 




Distorts competitor perspective of cost 
base potentially encouraging 
competitor to accept higher costs 
Distorts competitor perspective of cost base 
potentially driving competitor to attempt 
excessively low costs 
Policy effect Helps to make case for higher subsidy 
levels, but damages overall perception 
of technology viability 
Helps make case to Government that 
technology is on viable trajectory but 
potentially impacts subsidy support 
Public 
perception 
Damages perception of technology as 
on viable trajectory 
Enhances perception of technology as on 
viable trajectory 
Table 1: Impacts of cost distortion (authors' analysis)  
To summarise, it appears that there are various safeguards which suggest that while data in annual 
accounts may not subject from manipulation, it should nonetheless be more reliable than other data in 
the public domain. 
4. Methodology 
Ederer has pointed out that most offshore wind farm developments are undertaken through Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV) companies [15]. The use of SPVs allows parent company developers to insulate 
themselves from any liabilities potentially arising within the wind farm developments, and also makes 
asset sales easier, as shares in SPVs can easily be bought and sold as required. 
 
However, a perhaps-unintended consequence of the commercial decision to isolate risks within SPVs is 
that detailed cost information is available in the public domain. As SPVs are legally constituted 
companies, they are required to submit audited accounts to the appropriate authorities. In the UK this is 
Companies House, which has recently made accounts for all UK companies publicly available at no 
cost. The methodology presented here exploits this data source to extract cost data from these 
published reports to build detailed assessments of actual LCOE. 
 
This accounting information has some limitations: (1) accounting standards are not absolute, and offer 
some flexibility in presenting information; (2) accounts must be submitted within 9 months of the year 
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end, so there can be a small time lag in data; (3) accounts may relate to a fractional interest in the 
underlying wind farm, and different participants may adopt different accounting treatments; (4) 
accounts contain very limited information on wind farm operational performance; and, (5) there are a 
number of stages of technical analysis which must be undertaken to extract the required information. 
These are detailed in Sections 4.8 and 4.9. 
4.1. Source of Data  
The operational offshore wind farms in the UK, and the related SPVs, are listed in Table 2. A database 
of the relevant SPV accounts has been compiled and analysed to extract cost information according to 
the methodology which follows. 
 
In most cases, a single SPV accounts for all of the spend on a specific wind farm. In a limited number 
of cases, such as Gwynt y Mor and London Array, where multiple SPVs have interests in the 
underlying unincorporated joint venture, further analysis is required to identify total expenditures. 
 
In Gwynt y Mor, where UK Green Investment GYM Participant Limited has held a constant 10% in 
the wind farm, it is a simple matter to gross up figures to provide total costs. At London Array, where 
ownership changes have complicated the picture, figures from Orsted Energy London Array Limited, 
Orsted Energy London Array II Limited, E.On Climate and Renewables UK London Array Limited 
and Masdar Energy (UK) Limited have been combined to allow compilation of an aggregated picture.  
 
Some SPV names, and the interest they control in the underlying wind farm, have changed over time. 
Table 1 shows the current SPV names, and (where less than 100%) their current interest in the wind 
farm, as well as the dates for which accounts are available, and when the project transferred 
transmission assets to the Offshore Transmission Operator if applicable (see Sections 4.8 and 4.9). 
 
Wind farm SPV Company(ies) (Current names and 





Barrow Barrow Offshore Wind Limited 2001-2017 2011 
Burbo Bank Orsted Energy (Burbo) Limited 2002-2017 Not under 
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OFTO 
Burbo Extension Burbo Extension Limited 2011-2017 2018 
Dudgeon Dudgeon Offshore Wind Limited 2003-2017 2018 
Gunfleet Sands I Gunfleet Sands Limited 2001-2017 2011 
Greater Gabbard Greater Gabbard Offshore Winds Limited 2004-2017 2014 
Gunfleet Sands II Gunfleet Sands II Limited 2007-2017 2011 
Gwynt y Mor UK Green Investment GYM Participant 
Limited (10%),  
Innogy GyM 2 Limited (10%),  
Innogy GyM 3 Limited (10%),  
Innogy GyM 4 Limited (30%),  
GyM Renewables One Limited (10%), 
GyM Offshore One Limited (15%), GyM 
Offshore Two Limited (10%), GyM 
Offshore Three Limited (5%) 
2010-2017 2015 
Humber Gateway E.On Climate & Renewables UK Humber 
Wind Limited 
 2008-2017 2015 
Inner Dowsing Inner Dowsing Wind Farm Limited 2004-2017 Not under 
OFTO 




Vattenfall Europe Windkraft GmbH 
(German company) 
Not reviewed Not reviewed 
Lincs Lincs Wind Farm Limited 2001-2017 2014 
London Array Orsted Energy London Array Limited (0%) 
(formerly CORE Energy Limited), Orsted 
Energy London Array II Limited (25%),  
E.On Climate and Renewables UK London 
Array Limited (30%),  
Masdar Energy UK Limited (20%), Boreas 
2003-2017 2013 
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(Investments) Limited (25%) 
Lynn Lynn Wind Farm Limited 2001-2017 Not under 
OFTO 
North Hoyle NWP Offshore Limited 2002 -2017 Not under 
OFTO 
Ormonde Ormonde Energy Limited 2004-2017 2012 
Race Bank Race Bank Wind Farm Limited 2004-2017 2018 
Rhyl Flats Rhyl Flats Wind Farm Limited 2005-2017 Not under 
OFTO 
Robin Rigg East E.On Climate and Renewables UK Robin 
Rigg East Limited 
2006-2017 2011 
Robin Rigg West E.On Climate and Renewables UK Robin 
Rigg East Limited 
2002-2017 2011 
Scroby Sands E.On Climate and Renewables UK 
Offshore Wind Limited 
2003-2017 Not under 
OFTO 
Sheringham Shoal Scira Offshore Energy Limited 2004-2017 2013 
Teesside Teesside Windfarm Limited 2009-2017 Not under 
OFTO 
Thanet Thanet Offshore Wind Limited 2004-2017 2014 
Walney Walney (UK) Offshore Windfarms Limited 2005-2017 2011/12 
Walney Extension Orsted Energy Walney Extension (UK) 
Limited 
2011-2017 2016 





Westermost Rough Limited 2007-2017 2016 
Table 2: Wind farms and SPVs (authors’ analysis) 
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4.2. Capital costs 
Capital costs for each wind farm have been derived from the database for each year and for each wind 
farm. In order to identify capital costs, the additions to Fixed Assets have been extracted, and additions 
to Fixed Assets which do not represent cash expenditure (such as additions to the provision for 
decommissioning) are then removed. Capitalised interest, which is often treated as a fixed asset, is 
included in these costs, as it represents actual cash costs which are borne by the wind farm developer in 
completing the development. 
 
For those wind farms which sold their transmission assets under the Offshore Transmission Operator 
Regulations (OFTO projects), the costs of these assets has been captured separately, to allow analysis 
of the OFTO impact on LCOE. This is discussed further in Section 4.9. 
4.3. Operating costs 
In order to evaluate LCOE, the cash operating costs are required. In accounting terms, both costs of 
sales and administrative expenses (which we define as total operating costs) are relevant costs in 
calculating the LCOE of the wind farm, so it is appropriate to derive the total operating costs by 
subtracting depreciation from the sum of costs of sales and administrative expenses.  
 
For OFTO projects, these cash costs include OFTO charges from the date on which the OFTO transfer 
took place. This is discussed further in Section 4.9. 
4.4. Grants 
Some of the early projects were in receipt of capital grants. In some cases, grant receipts were shown as 
a credit to expenses (e.g. Burbo Bank, Kentish Flats, North Hoyle, Scroby Sands). Where this was the 
treatment, these amounts have been added back to yield accurate operating costs. In some other cases 
they were shown as interest income (e.g. Inner Dowsing, Lynn), or as other income (e.g. Barrow) and 
no correction is necessary. The corrections for grant income ensure that the operating cost figures used 
are accurate. 
4.5. Inflation adjustment 
The database comprises costs for each wind farm SPV for each year of development or operation. In 
order to compare each wind farm’s costs on a comparable basis, it is necessary to normalize for 
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inflation effects. A general European inflation factor1 has been applied to correct all figures to 2012 
terms. 2012 has been chosen as it is the base year for strike prices under the UK Contracts for 
Difference arrangements, so it seems the most appropriate base year for this correction. 
4.6. Energy production 
Details of the month by month energy production from wind farms accredited under the Renewables 
Obligation (RO) is available from OFGEM’s Renewables and CHP Register[22], albeit with a delay of 
around 4 months. This data has been downloaded and analysed. The ROC Register does not present 
project by project data before April 2006, and for the very limited number of offshore wind projects 
which were producing prior to this date, data has been extracted from the Renewable Energy 
Foundation website (which provides historic project by project ROC data before 2006) [23]. 
 
Wind farms operating under CfDs are not eligible for ROCs, but they are issued with Renewable 
Energy Guarantees of Origin (REGOs) which confirm the renewable origin of the electricity generated 
by these projects. OFGEM’s Renewables and CHP Register [22] provides data on issued REGOs, 
allowing the same derivation of production performance as the ROC register. 
 
For wind farms with limited production history data on the ROC or REGO registers, estimates of 
typical capacity factor can be derived from the performance of nearby offshore wind farms with longer 
production histories. If no nearby wind farms are available, typical average capacity factor can be used.  
4.7. Projections 
Offshore wind farms are typically expected to have an operating life of 20-25 years, and the earliest in 
this study began production only 15 years ago. It is therefore necessary to develop projections of costs 
and energy production over the full life of each project to establish a full life LCOE.  
 
In this analysis, a base case has been defined, in which real operating costs and production are kept 
constant at the average level achieved by the wind farm since commissioning. In the case of OFTO 
projects, operating costs are projected from the average operating cost for years after the OFTO 
transfer to ensure inclusion of OFTO charges.                                                         
1 The European index has been chosen as the single largest cost element, wind turbines, are generally 
produced in Denmark or Germany, making the European index appropriate. 
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Production projections have been based on average production levels from years of full production, 
defined as years in which production is greater than 60% of average production over the farm’s 
productive life (to compensate for low production in the year of commissioning). For those wind farms 
which have only recently begun production, and there is only a very short production history, an 
average capacity factor of 48% based on BEIS assumptions [6] has been used.  Of course, the 
performance of offshore wind farms can vary from year to year in response to the wind climate, but it 
is considered that using the average-to-date (where a meaningful time series is available) is a fair 
estimate over the full project life. 
4.8. OFTO regime 
Burges Salmon partner James Phillips, writing in Modern Power Systems, set out the basis for the 
Offshore Transmission regime and the principles of its operation [24]. 
 
He explained that under the “Third Package” of legislation on the liberalisation of energy markets, 
electricity generation and transmission assets were required to be “unbundled” – that is, not owned by 
the same entities. Accordingly, under powers in the Energy Act 2004, the Secretary of State 
implemented the Electricity (Competitive Tenders for Offshore Transmission Licences) Regulations 
2009.  
 
Under these regulations, wind farm operators which exported at 132 kV or more were required to sell 
their transmission assets to third parties (who were known as Offshore Transmission Network Owners, 
or OFTOs), who were empowered to earn a regulated return from these investments. 
 
Accordingly, many of the offshore wind farms under development at that stage were required to 
dispose of their transmission assets. These wind farm developers/operators received a capital sum for 
the assets, and were then contractually bound to pay operating charges to the OFTOs for up to 20 years. 
This had the effect of converting capital and operating costs of building and operating these assets into 
purely operating costs [24]. 
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A report by KPMG [25] suggested that OFTO investors were typically seeking and receiving returns of 
200 basis points over LIBOR, or around 3%, on their investments. A review by the Competition and 
Markets Authority [26] suggested that costs of capital for utilities engaged in generation activities 
might be in the range from 8-10%. The OFTO regime therefore makes lower cost capital available for 
funding a significant part of the wind farm generation and transmission system, thereby reducing the 
costs of financing (and therefore the discount rate to be used in the LCOE calculation). 
4.9. OFTO correction 
Accounts for OFTO-governed projects typically include the build costs of the OFTO assets as additions 
to fixed assets (prior to their transfer to the OFTO operator) and the OFTO charges paid by the wind 
farm operator as part of the operating costs. If both of these costs are left in the LCOE calculation, the 
costs of the OFTO are effectively counted twice.  
 
The capital costs of the OFTO assets are deducted from the wind farm total build costs, while the 
OFTO charges are left included within operating costs. This approach describes the economic situation 
for wind farm operators as it prevails under the OFTO regime. 
 
Wind farm accounts generally show a reduction in fixed assets when the OFTO assets are transferred to 
the OFTO operator. The Fixed Assets note to the accounts generally shows the cost of the OFTO asset 
which had been borne by the wind farm up to that point, and this sum can be subtracted from the total 
capital costs derived from Fixed Asset additions. Care is taken to ensure that the undepreciated cost is 
subtracted from the total fixed asset additions, to ensure that the full cost is removed from the capital 
costs in the LCOE calculation. 
 
Where there is a gain or loss on sale, this is included within the operating costs for that year, so the 
analysis correctly shows the cash effects for the developer (although it is not included in the average 
calculation of operating costs, to ensure that these reflect true costs of operation). 
4.10. Discount rate 
The discount used in the LCOE calculation has a significant effect on the outcome. Discount rates used 
by investors should reflect the risk implicit in the project, and it would be reasonable to expect the 
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discount rate applying to CfD projects, on which the revenue risk is much lower than for ROC projects, 
to be lower. Aldersey-Williams and Rubert [18] found that reducing the discount rate from the 8.9% 
currently applied by BEIS for offshore wind projects to the 7.8% it uses for CCGT projects resulted in 
a reduction in LCOE of 6%. Section 5.5 evaluates the impact of using a lower discount rate in the CfD 
projects.  
4.11. LCOE calculation 
These actual and projected figures are combined into the LCOE calculation, as defined by BEIS and 
shown in equation 1. A discount rate of 8.9% (in line with BEIS’s discount rate choice [6]) has been 
applied, and some sensitivities undertaken (see Section 5.5).  
 
The LCOE in these calculations includes the costs of the wind farm including its connection to the 
National Grid (either as a direct cost for non-OFTO projects or through OFTO fees for OFTO 
projects). The next section sets out the results of calculating LCOE for the UK’s operational wind 
farms using this approach. 
5. Results 
5.1. Overview of results 
The LCOE has been calculated for all UK projects which had reported production before the end of 
2017, set out in order of commissioning year, as shown in Table 2. In addition, the real capital cost per 
MW installed is evaluated, as this is a basis on which these data may be compared with public domain 
sources. 
5.1.1. LCOE results – all projects 
The summary results for all projects are shown in Table 2 and the overall trend of costs in Figure 2, 
which shows the LCOE for projects arranged in chronological order of commissioning. 
  





North Hoyle Non OFTO 2003           77.35  
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Kentish Flats Non OFTO 2006           66.43  
Scroby Sands Non OFTO 2006         104.83  
Barrow OFTO 2006           87.15  
Burbo Bank Non OFTO 2007           86.89  
Inner Dowsing Non OFTO 2008           96.59  
Lynn Non OFTO 2008         101.54  
Rhyl Flats Non OFTO 2009         125.62  
Gunfleet Sands I and II OFTO 2009         121.67  
Robin Rigg  OFTO 2010         135.49  
Thanet OFTO 2010         158.69  
Greater Gabbard OFTO 2011         136.62  
Ormonde OFTO 2011 149.08  
Walney OFTO 2011         120.37  
London Array OFTO 2012         139.89  
Sheringham Shoal OFTO 2012           150.34  
Teesside Non OFTO 2013         235.96  
Lincs OFTO 2013         166.053  
Gwynt y Mor OFTO 2014         179.18  
Westermost Rough OFTO 2014         120.82  
West of Duddon OFTO 2014          72.11  
Humber Gateway OFTO 2015         147.13  
Burbo Bank Extension1 OFTO 2016         146.95 
Dudgeon1 OFTO 2017         104.07 
Galloper1 OFTO 2017         133.89 
Race Bank1 OFTO 2017         118.09 
Walney Extension1 OFTO 2017         100.24 
Table 3: LCOE (all projects, authors’ analysis) 
1 due to short production histories for these wind farms, some assumptions are required. A typical 
modern offshore wind farm capacity factor of 48% has been applied in line with BEIS assumptions[6]; 
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an average operating cost of 37/MWh has been applied based on the average post-OFTO operating 
costs found in this analysis and OFTO capital costs have been taken from the most recent accounts. 
These figures should be treated with some caution. 
 
The same data is presented graphically in Figure 2.   
 
Figure 2: LCOE for all projects, chronological order by commissioning (authors’ analysis). (NB solid 
bars show data for wind farms with full accounts-based and historic production data, striped where 
assumptions are used on capacity factor, OFTO transfer and operating costs) 
 
5.2. LCOE Outliers 
The Teesside project immediately stands out as having an anomalously high LCOE, while West of 
Duddon Sands appears low. 
5.2.1. Teesside 
 
The Teesside project employed 2.3MW turbines. These were outdated by its commissioning date of 
2012, as the typical turbine size by this date was 3.6MW or larger. 
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This turbine choice, which obviously necessitated more foundations and installation work than a larger 
turbine size, along with significant delays in its consenting and development process, combined to push 
up the LCOE. Analysis of ROC data from the ROC Register [22] shows that Teesside also had a low 
capacity factor of 15-25% over its first years of operation, further increasing the LCOE. A sensitivity 
analysis in which it is assumed that the project can achieve a more realistic capacity factor of 35% for 
future years shows the LCOE reducing to £221.81/MWh. While this is slightly closer to the typical 
LCOE at that time, it suggests that the majority of the excess LCOE is due to capital cost and schedule 
overruns. 
5.2.2. West of Duddon Sands 
The LCOE for the West of Duddon Sands project appears to be exceptionally low. This project had a 
development timescale comparable to its neighbour at Walney and achieved a similar ramp up in 
production. The key differentiator was the low cost per MW installed relative to Walney. This is 
inferred to be due to improvements in installation process and costs, as both projects deployed Siemens 
3.6MW turbines (although Walney used both 107m and 120m diameter variants).   
5.3. LCOE trends 
Figure 2 shows an upward trend in LCOE for offshore wind for projects developed up to and including 
Thanet, from less than £100/MWh to more than £150/MWh (excluding the Teesside project).  
 
Many commentators, such as Greenacre et al., Heptonstall et al., Ioannou et al. and Voormolen et al. 
[2, 27-29] have linked the original increasing cost trajectory to the trend towards situating wind farms 
in deeper water, further from shore. 
 
After excluding the apparent outlier of Teesside, it appears that LCOE increased gradually to a 
maximum of around £150/MWh in Thanet, after which it began a gradual decline, although project 
LCOEs vary widely. 
 
A review of the trends would suggest that new wind farms are now achieving LCOE of around 
£100/MWh, which is still considerably above the level implied by the most recent CfD bids of 
£57.50/MWh.  
 22 
5.4. LCOE sensitivities 
The LCOE metric is sensitive to capital cost, production forecasting and discount rate. The 
methodology adopted in this paper addresses uncertainty in capital cost by using data from accounts, 
but the effect of uncertainty in production and choice of discount rate requires analysis. 
5.4.1. Production forecasting 
A recent study by Staffel and Green [30] used ROC data to evaluate trends in onshore wind farm 
performance with the “age” of turbines. They found that wind farm performance declined by 1.6%+/- 
0.2% per annum as turbines aged. Their dataset was limited to onshore wind farms, as they recognised 
that there was insufficient depth in the offshore fleet to provide a meaningful basis for analysis. This 
remains the case. However, it is recognised that the same factors which lead to performance 
degradation onshore are likely to be equally valid offshore. Accordingly, a sensitivity analysis has been 
undertaken to assess the impact on LCOE of an annual performance degradation of 1.6% in output. 
 
The impact on LCOE for the offshore wind farms evaluated here is an increase of between 1% and 8%, 
depending on the date of commissioning date of the wind farm. The LCOE impact is greater for the 
most recently commissioned wind farms, as the older wind farms’ LCOE is more heavily based on 
actual performance. 
5.5. Sensitivity to discount rate 
As discussed in section 4.10, the discount rate used in the LCOE calculation has a significant effect on 
the outcome. The introduction of Contracts for Difference has significantly changed the risk profile of 
offshore wind investment and it can be argued that the discount rate for CfD projects relative to ROC 
projects should be significantly lower. Aldersey-Williams and Rubert[18] found that current UK 
offshore wind projects were being financed with 75% debt/25% equity, with the debt secured at rates 
of 3.5%-4%. If an equity return of 15% is assumed, the resulting WACC is less than 7%. In this 
sensitivity, a discount rate of 7% has therefore been applied to the CfD-supported projects. Table 4 
shows that this lower discount rate reduces the LCOE by around 10% for these projects. 
 
 
LCOE (£/MWh) LCOE (£/MWh) 
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Discount rate at 8.9% Discount rate at 7% 






Race Bank 118.09 
105.46 
Walney Extension 100.24 
90.74 
Table 3: Impact of reduced discount rate for CfD wind farms LCOE (authors' analysis) 
 
5.6. Capital cost per MW installed 
The capital cost per MW installed is another widely used comparative metric. It is shown, in 2012 real 
terms, for each project in Figure 3. This shows a clear increase from £1.5-2 million/MW for the early 





Figure 3: Capital cost per MW installed (2012 real terms), authors’ analysis (NB solid bars show data 
for wind farms with full accounts-based and historic production data, striped where assumptions are 
used on capacity factor, OFTO transfer and operating costs) 
The increase in LCOE in more recent projects is proportionately less than the increase in cost per MW, 
suggesting that production performance has increased, development timescales have been compressed 
or operating costs have been reduced, or a combination of these factors, over successive generations of 
wind farm development.  
 
This analysis is consistent with Ernst and Young’s 2009 report [31], which noted that “average capital 
costs have doubled over the last five year to c. £3.2million/MW; the cost increase appears largely 
driven by supply chain constraints for components (e.g. wind turbine generators) and services (e.g. 
installation)”. It is also consistent with anecdotal evidence from informal discussions with developers, 
who often claim that turbine prices increased after the introduction of ROC banding (and therefore the 
higher revenue expectations among developers). Rhyl Flats was among the first offshore wind farms to 
be built in the foreknowledge of higher support under the RO, and shows a cost per MW installed 
significantly higher than earlier projects. 
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5.7. International comparisons 
International data [32] suggest that the overall cost trend of UK offshore wind is broadly in line with 
international cost trends in wind turbine costs. Figure 4 shows wind turbine prices in the US and 
globally [32] and shows a peak in around 2008 – when the Thanet project was procuring its turbines 
[19]. The data in Figure 4 comes from a range of sources, including “financial and regulatory filings, as 
well as press releases and news reports” [32] and is therefore considered to be meaningful. A better 
comparison would require accounts-based LCOE estimates for international projects, which lie beyond 
the scope of this paper, but would be an interesting direction for future research.  
 
Figure 4: International turbine price trends (from [32]) 
While the overall cost trend in UK offshore wind is now downward, the degree of reduction is less than 
for turbine prices as noted in the US Department of Energy’s report. This is inferred to reflect the siting 
of UK wind farms in more distant offshore locations and deeper water, driving up installation and 
foundation costs.  
5.8. CCGT example 
The same methodology has been applied to the Coryton CCGT power station, which was built between 
1999 and 2001 and began commercial operation in 2002. Coryton CCGT is operated through a SPV 
called Coryton Energy Company Limited which files accounts at Companies House. Analysis of the 
accounts shows a total real (2012) capital spend of £71 million, and annual operating costs varying 
between £75 million and £330 million with the variation driven very largely by fuel prices. An average 
 26 
of £110 million, based on the average real operating cost over the project’s operating life to date has 
been applied for forecasting future opex.  
 
Production data is not available for the full operating life of the project. Data is available for the period 
2010-2014 (2015 forecast) [33] and this has been applied in the model. Where production data is not 
available, an average load factor of 34% has been used. This is the average load factor for CCGT for 
2012-2016 reported in Digest of UK Energy Statistics, Table 5.1 [34] and is comparable to the average 
load factor of 32% for the period for which project data is available. A discount rate of 7.5% as applied 
by BEIS for this technology [6] has been used. The resulting LCOE (2012 real terms) is £62.63/MWh. 
 
The methodology is demonstrated to be applicable to any project organized in a SPV where meaningful 
production data can be found. 
 
6. Comparison with other work 
As previously noted, researchers, analysts and other professional commentators on offshore wind costs 
have generally used data compiled from public domain sources [4, 6-14]. In general, their cost 
databases are not published, making comparison of costs developed from the approach detailed here 
with publicly gleaned information difficult. However, two full data sources are available for 
comparison.  
 
The datasets are the 4C Offshore website [19], which we believe sets out nominal (money of the day) 
costs, and the Global Warming Policy Foundation’s report [5] which makes corrections for inflation 
and reports in 2012 terms. Neither of these datasets evaluates LCOE but both allow for evaluation of 
the capital cost per installed MW. 
 
These data are set out in Table 5 for the wind farms capable of analysis using the accounts-based 
method set out here.  
Name  
 This analysis 
(£ million 
 4C 
Offshore  (£ 
 GWPF   
(£ million 
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/MW)  million 
/MW)  
/MW)  
Barrow  1.49 1.37 1.53 
Burbo Bank Extension 4.05 3.15 NA 
Burbo Bank   1.79 1.53 1.10 
Dudgeon  2.09 3.73 3.44 
Greater Gabbard  3.21 3.28 2.98 
Gwynt y Mor  3.41 3.33 3.33 
Humber Gateway  3.48 3.36 3.23 
Inner Dowsing  2.15 1.54 1.63 
Kentish Flats  1.22 1.17 1.57 
Lincs  3.66 3.70 3.63 
London Array  3.13 3.23 2.80 
Lynn  2.22 1.54 1.63 
North Hoyle  1.88 1.35 1.63 
Ormonde  3.00 2.98 3.68 
Rhyl Flats  2.84 2.11 2.31 
Robin Rigg  2.79 2.19 2.36 
Scroby Sands  2.30 1.28 1.50 
Sheringham Shoal  3.78 3.42 3.47 
Teesside  3.53 3.22 3.16 
Thanet  3.14 3.00 3.11 
Walney    2.89 3.43 3.39 
West of Duddon Sands  1.50 3.22 3.11 
Westermost Rough  2.58 2.95 3.38 
Table 5: Capital cost per MW; authors’ analysis, [5,19]. 
It is clear that these estimates vary widely, with the main drivers of cost per MW being turbine costs, 
distance from shore, foundation type and installation strategy [35].  
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Figure 5 shows the percentage difference between the figure for capital cost per MW from the analysis 
of accounts undertaken here and two relatively complete public sources - 4C Offshore [19] and the 
Global Warming Policy Foundation [5]. The close parallels between the 4C and GWPF data can be 
explained as the GWPF data is gathered, at least in part from 4C Offshore. 
 
In many cases, the public domain cost figures are c. 20% lower than the capital costs from accounting 
data, although there are cases where the public domain data significantly higher, notably Burbo Bank, 
Kentish Flats, Ormonde, Walney, West of Duddon Sands and Westermost Rough. 
 
 
Figure 5: Percentage difference between public data and this analysis; authors’ analysis and [5, 19]. 
 
As capital cost/MW is the most important factor in assessing the LCOE for offshore wind projects (as 
operating costs only typically contribute around a quarter of the LCOE, while Capex contributes the 
majority [6]), these discrepancies will have a significant effect on estimates of LCOE in the existing 
literature. These discrepancies further demonstrate that public domain data is not wholly to be relied 
on. 
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7. Required cost trends 
This analysis has shown that there may be a gradual downward trend in LCOE for UK offshore wind 
farms since about 2010. It is interesting to consider the LCOE which offshore wind must achieve in 
order to offer commercial returns at the prices at which recent CfDs have been awarded. 
 
The most recent CfDs were awarded at a price (in 2012 terms) of £57.50/MWh, while the analysis here 
shows that modern wind farms typically have a LCOE of c. £100/MWh. Although as Aldersey-
Williams and Rubert make clear [18] the LCOE and strike price are only the same in a zero-inflation 
world, it is nonetheless clear that very significant reductions are required to wind farm costs to offer 
economic projects in the context of current strike prices.  
 
One key area in which LCOE can be reduced is by reducing the discount rate used for the calculation. 
The discount rate reflects the investment risk in the project, and the introduction of CfDs significantly 
reduces the revenue risk for the developers. As noted in Sections 4.10 and 5.5, lower discount rates, 
reflecting the lower risk of CfDs, help to reduce wind farm LCOE. 
 
8. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper has presented a new methodology for determining LCOE in cases where reliable audited 
data is available. It is observed that much of the existing literature examining costs and trends in 
offshore wind is potentially compromised by inaccuracy, inconsistency or selective presentation by 
developers.  
Application of this new methodology suggests that the LCOE for new wind farms is still significantly 
higher than the level of recent CfD strike price bids. There are some encouraging signs, however, as the 
recent West of Duddon Sands project has a LCOE of less than £100/MWh. 
 
It is clear that continuing LCOE reduction will require continuing technological evolution, as well as 
more efficient operating practices and lower discount rates to reflect the reduced revenue risk under 
CfDs. Technological improvements are likely to be dominated by the continuing trend to increasing 
turbine capacity. This is exemplified by GE’s recent announcement of a 12MW turbine [36]. Larger 
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turbines allow more installed capacity per foundation, and therefore offer economies of scale in 
manufacture and installation. Fewer turbines also offer economies of scale in operational costs, as the 
costs of maintaining a turbine are largely determined by access costs, rather than by each turbine’s 
rated capacity. Larger wind farms also make alternative operational strategies viable, as demonstrated 
by the emergence of Service Operations Vessels [37] - vessels based at sea within the wind farm, 
offering 24/7 service and higher reliability and production. 
 
The LCOE result is also determined by the discount rate used, just as the economic returns of the wind 
farm are driven by its capital structure. The introduction of CfDs reduces the revenue risk for 
developers relative to wind farm projects supported under the RO. It is reported that this reduced risk 
can allow the use of a higher proportion of debt than RO projects [38, 39], thereby justifying the use of 
a lower discount rate and reducing the LCOE.  
 
This paper has found that much of the analysis of offshore wind costs, and the trends they show, is 
based on public domain data which are shown to be inconsistent with cost data taken from audited 
accounts, which are considered to be more reliable. Significant discrepancies in capital cost per MW 
have been found, with public domain data found to be both higher and lower than data from accounts. 
As a result, policy choices based on these data may be flawed with important effects on the future 
energy mix. 
 
More widely, the methodology is seen to be equally valid for any power project configured as a Special 
Purpose Vehicle and where production data is available or can be reasonably estimated. 
 
In conclusion this paper has presented and applied a new methodology for developing LCOE data and 
applied it to a number of offshore wind farms and to one CCGT project. The new methodology, 
explained here in detail for the first time, offers a robust route to evaluation of key data and trends in 





The authors are grateful to Angus Nicolson of Nicolson Accountancy and Fiona Salzen for technical 
accounting input, and to Judith Aldersey-Williams for critical input. 
 
References 
[1] GWEC. Offshore Wind - Global Wind 2016 Report. 2016; Available at: http://www.gwec.net/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/Global-Offshore-2016-and-Beyond.pdf. Accessed 04/13, 2018. 
[2] Greenacre P, Gross R, Heptonstall P. Great Expectations: The cost of offshore wind in UK Waters - 
understanding the past and projecting the future.  A report produced by the Technology and Policy 
Assessment Function of the UK Energy Research Centre. : UK Energy Research Centre; 2010. 
[3] FOWIND Consortium. Offshore Wind Policy and Market Assessment - a Global Outlook. 2014; 
Available at: http://www.gwec.net/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/FOWIND_offshore_wind_policy_and_market_assessment_15-02-
02_LowRes.pdf. Accessed 03/20, 2018. 
[4] Partridge I. Cost comparisons for wind and thermal power generation. Energy Policy 
2018;112:272-279. 
[5] Hughes G, Aris C, Constable J. Offshore Wind Strike Prices - Behind the headlines. 2017;GWPF 
Briefing 26. 
[6] HM Government Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. Electricity Generation 
Costs. ; 2016. 
[7] Lazard. Lazard's Levelized Cost of Energy Analysis - Version 10.0. ; 2016. 
[8] Gonzalez-Rodriguez AG. Review of offshore wind farm cost components. Energy for Sustainable 
Development 2017 4;37:10-19. 
[9] Heck N, Smith C, Hittinger E. A Monte Carlo approach to integrating uncertainty into the levelized 
cost of electricity. The Electricity Journal 2016 4;29(3):21-30. 
[10] Cartelle Barros JJ, Lara Coira M, de la Cruz López,María Pilar, del Caño Gochi A. Probabilistic 
life-cycle cost analysis for renewable and non-renewable power plants. Energy 2016 10/1;112:774-787. 
[11] van der Zwaan B, Rivera-Tinoco R, Lensink S, van den Oosterkamp P. Cost reductions for 
offshore wind power: Exploring the balance between scaling, learning and R&D. Renewable Energy 
2012 5;41:389-393. 
[12] Ferioli F, Schoots K, van der Zwaan BCC. Use and limitations of learning curves for energy 
technology policy: A component-learning hypothesis. Energy Policy 2009 7;37(7):2525-2535. 
[13] MacGillivray A, Jeffrey H, Winskel M, Bryden I. Innovation and cost reduction for marine 
renewable energy: A learning investment sensitivity analysis. Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change 2014 9;87:108-124. 
[14] Williams E, Hittinger E, Carvalho R, Williams R. Wind power costs expected to decrease due to 
technological progress. Energy Policy 2017 July 2017;106:427-435. 
[15] Ederer N. Evaluating capital and operating cost efficiency of offshore wind farms: A DEA 
approach. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 2015 February 2015;42:1034-1046. 
[16] EY. Ernst & Young: Analysis of the value creation potential of wind energy policies.  A 
comparative study of the macroeconomic benefits of wind and CCGT power generation. 2012;EYG no. 
AU1449. 
[17] Arup. Review of Renewable Electricity Generation Cost and Technical Assumptions - Study 
Report. 2016 28 June 2016. 
[18] Aldersey-Williams J, Rubert T. Levelised cost of energy – A theoretical justification and critical 
assessment. Energy Policy 2019 January 2019;124:169-179. 
[19] 4C Offshore. 4C Offshore - Offshore Wind Farms. 2017; Available at: 
www.4coffshore.com/windfarms/. Accessed March 7, 2017. 
[20] Rubin ES, Azevedo IML, Jaramillo P, Yeh S. A review of learning rates for electricity supply 
technologies. Energy Policy 2015 11;86:198-218. 
[21] Lindman Å, Söderholm P. Wind power learning rates: A conceptual review and meta-analysis. 
Energy Econ 2012 05;34(3):754-761. 
[22] OFGEM. ROC Register. 2017; Available at: www.renewablesandchp.ofgem.gov.uk. Accessed 
March 7, 2017. 
[23] Renewable Energy Foundation. Renewable generators. 2018; Available at: 
http://www.ref.org.uk/generators/index.php. Accessed 03/08, 2018. 
 32 
[24] Phillips J. Offshore tranmission: the licensing regime explained. 2013; Available at: 
http://www.modernpowersystems.com/features/featureoffshore-transmission-the-licensing-regime-
explained/. Accessed 02/21, 2018. 
[25] KPMG. Offshore Transmission: An Investor Perspective - Update Report. 2014; Available at: 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/85943/offshoretransmission-aninvestorperspective-
updatereport.pdf. Accessed 03/03, 2018. 
[26] Competition and Markets Authority. Energy market investigation: Analysis of cost of capital of 
energy firms. 2015. 
[27] Heptonstall P, Gross R, Greenacre P, Cockerill T. The cost of offshore wind: Understanding the 
past and projecting the future. Energy Policy 2012 2;41:815-821. 
[28] Ioannou A, Angus A, Brennan F. Stochastic Prediction of Offshore Wind Farm LCOE through an 
Integrated Cost Model. Energy Procedia 2017 2;107:383-389. 
[29] Voormolen JA, Junginger HM, van Sark WGJHM. Unravelling historical cost developments of 
offshore wind energy in Europe. Energy Policy 2016 1;88:435-444. 
[30] Staffell I, Green R. How does wind farm performance decline with age? Renewable Energy 2014 
June 2014;66:775-786. 
[31] Ernst & Young. Cost of and support for offshore wind. 2009; Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.berr.gov.uk/files/file51142.pdf. Accessed 
03/20, 2018. 
[32] US Department of Energy. 2017 Wind Technologies Market Report. 2017. 
[33] National Grid. Draft Annual Load Factors for 2016/17 Generation TNuoS Charges. 2015; 
Available at: https://www.nationalgrid.com/sites/default/files/documents/44135-
Draft%20ALF%202016-17.pdf. Accessed 03/28, 2018. 
[34] HM Government. Digest of UK Energy Statistics, 2000. 2000; Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/200012061239/http://www.dti.gov.uk:80/epa/digest.htm. 
Accessed September/18, 2017. 
[35] Ebenhoch R, Matha D, Marathe S, Muñoz PC, Molins C. Comparative Levelized Cost of Energy 
Analysis. Energy Procedia 2015;80:108-122. 
[36] GE Renewable Energy. Haliade-X Offshore Wind Turbine Platform. 2018; Available at: 
https://www.gerenewableenergy.com/wind-energy/turbines/haliade-x-offshore-turbine. Accessed 
03/05, 2018. 
[37] Esvagt. Two new windfarm service vessels direct the international spotlight on Esvagt. Available 
at: https://www.esvagt.com/news/news/two-new-windfarm-service-vessels-direct-international-
spotlight-esvagt/. Accessed 1/11, 2018. 
[38] Wind Europe. Financing and Investment Trends - the European Wind Industry in 2016. 2016 
24/5/2016;2018(2/9). 
[39] Offshorewind.biz. Linklaters helps bring Beatrice to Financial Close. 2016; Available at: 
https://www.offshorewind.biz/2016/05/24/linklaters-helps-bring-beatrice-to-financial-close/. Accessed 
02/01, 2017. 
 
